Music and Politics in Hitler’s Germany

In the years 1933-1945, Hitler’s Nazi Party [National Socialist
Democratic Workers Party / NSDAP] used music as a tool to forge political unity
among Germans.

Hitler and the senior NSDAP leadership instinctively grasped

that among the arts, music was the most readily laden with ideology, and could
inculcate both the youth and the masses with state-serving Bildung. 1

Nazi

music education, promoted heavily by and among the Hitler Youth, expanded along
with concerns of “cultural Bolshevism,” and served as a counterpoint to
“degenerate music.” 2

Once in power, Hitler moved to purge music and music

scholarship of Jews in an effort to promote the unique origin myths of the
German Volk and further saturate citizens with racial theories.

In keeping

with origin myths and racialism were the Romantic works of the composer Richard
Wagner, a prominent anti-Semite who would assume supreme musical status in
Hitler’s Germany. 3

In such a personalized regime as Hitler’s, the dictator’s

tastes virtually defined official aesthetic norms. 4
Throughout the period of Hitler’s chancellorship, the musical bureaucracy
of the NSDAP would struggle to balance the tensions between art music
(symbolized by Wagner) and popular demand for music such as jazz.

These very

tensions were also reflected in the musical policies of the German occupation
of Eastern Europe and Soviet Russia, an occupation which simultaneously
plundered antique musical treasures and brought about demand for popular fare
behind the lines.

Ultimately the adoring songs of the soldiers – many of them

graduates of the Hitler Youth -- would transform into a dirge.

German musical

culture and education would thereafter split between the Allied-occupied West
and the anti-fascist East.

This paper will examine administrative, educational,

and artistic aspects of musical policies in the Third Reich. 5
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Nazi Musical Hierarchy
The appearance of absolute hierarchy in the National Socialist state was
belied by a befuddling proliferation of informal bureaucracies.

Justified by

vague and turgidly-worded memos from their Führer, Hitler’s close associates
carved out their own personal spheres of influence. 6

Hitler’s unwillingness to

clearly lay out lines of command, combined with his intense personal interest
in artistic policy, resulted in an administrative situation in the arts which
was exceedingly complicated.

In 1933, competing National Socialist entities

separately claimed control of all musical theaters in the Reich, proclaimed
jurisdiction over all state musicians, pronounced guidelines for publication of
musical materials, and sparred over administration of musical culture
generally. 7

A key figure in these struggles, and a key figure in any study of

Nazi cultural policy, was Alfred Rosenberg.

For all of his failings – from

inflating Hitler’s trust to vacillating administration in the occupation of the
East – Rosenberg undeniably possessed a keen awareness of the power and potency
of art forms as a means of ideological struggle. 8

In response to electoral

defeats in 1928, Rosenberg had fashioned a political contingent upon the arts
that would attract the German middle class to the NSDAP.

He also established

the Nazi Society for German Culture [Nationalsozialistische Gesellshaft für
deutsche Kultur].
In keeping with the administrative entropy that characterized Nazi
operations, Rosenberg’s Society for German Culture spawned still more
organizations. The League of Struggle for German Culture [Kampfbund für
deutsche Kultur], founded in 1930, became an important offshoot.

This

organization consisted of departments for music, cinema, visual arts, and radio,
and effectively served as the forerunner of Goebbel’s Ministry for
Enlightenment and Propaganda [Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und
Propaganda].

In 1933, Rosenberg’s adjutants seized control of German music
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publications such as Die Musik, which thereafter incessantly warned of the
deleterious effects of “un-German,” (i.e., Bolshevik and Jewish) musical
culture.

Membership in the Kampfbund für deutsche Kultur shot upwards.

From a

membership of one thousand in 1932, the Kampfbund saw more than 20,000 new
members join up in the first eight months of Hitler’s Chancellorship. 9

Music

thus functioned not only as an emblem of German distinctiveness, but served as
a magnet for mass involvement in party activities. 10
Rosenberg was the early architect of Nazi cultural policies, but he was
not their ultimate champion.

On July 20, 1933, only months after the

Gleichshaltung, Hitler arrogated far-reaching oversight over state culture to
Joseph Goebbels. 11

A philologist and failed writer, Goebbels welded the whole

of German artistic culture to the aims of the Nazi state. 12

The diminutive

Goebbels would have lasting impacts on German musical culture.

The ease of

Goebbels’ first task—the co-opting of arts organizations—had been facilitated
by the financial devastation of the preceding Weimar Republic.

The Weimer era

may have produced some of Germany’s greatest cultural figures, but a period of
fiscal abundance it was not.

Orchestras, the Berlin Philharmonic among them,

were actively seeking state support and patronage from any party in 1933. 13
Guided by Goebbels, the Nazis supplied the Philharmonic with operating funds
and in the process armed themselves with a significant tool that conferred the
Party additional legitimacy among German elites.
Not only symphony orchestras fell under Nazi sway.

On September 22,

Goebbels established the Reichsmusikkammer (Reichs Chamber of Music).

Although

Richard Strauss was the president of the RMK, real power lay in the hands of
the organization’s chair, Peter Raabe, pliant and anti-Semetic musicologist. 14
By 1934, the organization consisted of seven departments for composers,
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performing musicians, concert managers and publicists, choral and folk singers,
music publishers, music dealers, and music instrument manufacturers,
respectively. 15

The high degree of organization indicated also that the RMK

was not free to set its own course in the arts.

In keeping with his desire to

see the Propaganda Ministry become the cultural arbiter for all of society,
Goebbels would provide the RMK with direction from above.

As scholars would

later note, “the Reichsmusikkammer and German musical life were to become a
single entity.” 16
Although orchestras suffered purges of their Jewish personnel, orchestral
programming was not immediately brought into harmony with the anti-Semetic
party line.

Felix Mendelssohn, Berlin’s wunderkind of the early 19th century,

initially escaped censure, and his celebrated Violin Concerto remained on the
programs of the Berlin Philharmonic.

Stravinsky, another problematic Jewish

genius, enjoyed a 1935 performance of “Firebird” in Berlin. 17

In the autumn

of that year, however, the NSDAP cultural apparatus initiated more codified
efforts to end the performance of music even marginally associated with Jews.
On September 1, 1935, Gobbels’ Propaganda Ministry issued a document for
internal circulation, outlining a “blacklist” of 108 composers whose
could no longer be played in the lands ruled by the Reich.
listed, most were Jewish.

works

Of the composers

Goebbels clearly attributed high importance to both

classical music and the elimination of the “Judenfrage” within the community of
musicians. 18

As if the ouster of scores of composers had not made his case

explicit enough, Goebbels orchestrated a public ceremony outside the venerable
Leipzig Gewandhaus in order to tear down Mendelssohn’s bust.

Little would be

left to chance in the sphere of high culture.

Music and Youth
With the inception of Nazi rule in Thuringina and across Germany, the
NSDAP conspicuously sought legitimacy through the promotion of German music.
The National Socialists thus merged their ideology with a deeply ingrained
15
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German song culture in a successful bid to assume a leading role in the music
education of the youth. Such a perspective is particularly necessary when one
considers Germany occupied an elite position at the end of Weimar period as a
world leader in the realm of music education.

In the free-wheeling mélange

that preceded Hitler’s accession to the Chancellorship, a number of German
music educators and pedagogues had experimented with bold pedagogical
approaches that have since become the pillars of Western musical education. 19
The emerging pedagogical canons promoted Carl Orff and J.E. Dalcroze, however,
were eventually overwhelmed by the ideologically-driven National Socialist
party machinery.

Working from the basis of German tradition, German music

educators were inevitably co-opted by the state.
Like the music historians whose work is examined by Pamela Potter, German
music educators also had to pay obeisance to the skewed racial theories of the
National Socialist leadership.

While music historians were scrounging

selectively for examples of “Musik im Judentum,” the task of music educators
became similarly wrapped up with the National Socialist cause.

One National

Socialist music educator, Fritz Jöde, wrote of the important role played by
music in Kindergarten, a level he clearly believed should mark the beginning of
overt state control over children.

Euphemistically, Jöde wrote of Kindergarten

as “a conclusive break from children’s reliance on their mothers” and the
beginning of “going their own way…to fulfill their goals and dreams as
adults.” 20

Kindergarten marked a clear opportunity for the state to sedulously

promote Nazism through ideological texts.
Wolfgang Stumme, an educator and editor, became one of the most prolific
advocates of National Socialist music education.

His 1944 essay “Music in the

Hitler Youth” reveals much about the climate for arts education under the
Nazis. 21

Stumme enthusiastically cited over nine hundred musical groups united

under the banner of the Hitler Youth, including all manner of youth choirs.

To

this list, Stumme noted the presence of “orchestras, instrumental groups,
groups of wind-playing comrades, music teams, sport and fanfare teams, song19
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playing and puppet shows, and radio groups,” all sponsored by the Hitler Youth.
Stumme, in a veiled plea for resources in the waning years of the Second World
War, linked the expansion of music groups to the war effort:

This high number [of musical groups] has arisen from the progress
of the war, the beginning of which saw only one hundred unified
[Hitler Youth] music groups. These groups evidence the
foundational emotions of gratefulness that Germans hold toward all
cultural efforts of the Hitler Youth; they also prove that
political leadership and music education are intimately unified.
The war has established itself as the father of music practice,
and formed an explicit antithesis of the old Latin saying that
during the war the muses must have silence. The rich number of
Hitler’s words [zahlreich Führerworte] on the “importance” of art
are like the deepest kernels which the youth, in their action,
transform into a constant state of fulfillment. 22
Throughout the war effort, Hitler Youth raised flagging morale by singing at
community events, hospitals, and factories.

In the words of one Hitler Youth

executive, performances of the “Hitler Youth Cultural Circle” simultaneously
supported the war effort and “expose[d] the boys and girls to our nation’s most
valuable cultural heritage.” 23

German musical traditions thus fused with

party-centered patriotism.
The music of the Hitler Youth played an important role in state
indoctrination and public morale, and the visual arts thus validated and
eulogized the idea of musical youth.

A mural by Jürgen Wegener shows the ideal

musical setting for the boys of the Hitler Youth.

The centerpiece of his

triptych shows six boys in a circle, grasping bugle and drum, joining in the
anthem entitled “For us the sun never sets.” 24

Such images were infused with

the National Socialist desire to unite the nation through the martial music of
the youth.

It was not merely by coincidence, after all, that Leni Riefenstahl

chose to highlight group musical activities of German youth in her film
apotheosis of the Nazi Party, Triumph of the Will.
22
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Beyond mere imagery, National Socialist musical curricula dipped deep
into the stream of German folk tunes, creating a base of easily-retained tunes
onto which nationalist texts could be sedulously placed. 25

The Nazis thus used

the classic totalitarian model of music education first promoted by Plato,
while simultaneously drawing upon theories of Martin Luther in order to improve
the efficacy of their musical indoctrination. 26

In an age proliferating with

radios and jazz, however, these techniques would be severely tested.
were not alone in their efforts to secure the loyalty of the youth.

The Nazis
Music was

a battleground through which the NSDAP endeavored to wrest control of
children’s hearts and minds from Germany’s established churches.
While maneuvering to separate the youth from the churches, the National
Socialist Party also moved to counter secular rivals in the sphere of music
education.

As became apparent in Vienna, the NSDAP expanded its influence

among the youth by establishing Hitler Jungend music schools. 27

The Anschluss

of 1938 had not resulted in the immediate Nazi control over the musical
apparatus; indeed, Vienna’s relative cultural autonomy in the early months of
the Anschluss was reflected in the independence of all twenty-seven of the
city’s youth music schools.

As part of political consolidation in 1938, the

National Socialists opened two branch schools [Zweigschule für Volk und
Jungend].

The first of these schools was planned for and administered by the

Hitler Youth. 28

By 1942, the Hitler Youth music school had attracted

sufficient numbers of students to close down six of Vienna’s non-Nazi youth
music schools.

Administrator Othmar Steinbauer, the head of the Hitler Youth

schools, celebrated this triumph in a statement flecked with Austrian dialect:
“Now only the Party is the force for progress.

In strenuous cooperation with

the community of Vienna, we set out to create a school fully new in form,
through which the Volk, the youth, the industrious classes, and the artistic
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elite will unite and train for music.” 29

The unity that had eluded Germans

during the Weimar period could now be achieved through dedication to a common
musical culture.
Epitomizing this common musical culture was folk music, a genre which
took on renewed importance in the Nazi period.

Although Germans had been

drawing inspiration from their linguistic and mythical origins since the early
nineteenth century, the Nazis enacted a particularly forceful and selfconscious turn to this product of the Volk.

A 1934 essay by Fritz Stein, a

music professor in Bremen, directly illustrates the connection between Nazi
ideology and folk music.

Stein’s essay “On the Nature of German Music” posited

that folk music was the key method of unifying a fragmentary people. 30
Moreover, as long as it remained undiluted and true to its German roots, folk
music was an essential means of gaining respect abroad.

The purity of German

music, the sacred symbol of the Volk, was also a means of national cultural
defense in a hostile world.

Stein described the responsibilities of the

musician in the Third Reich:
The task of the German guardians of music is to be the
intermediaries between art and the Volk. Our experience with
German musical culture allows us to understand uniquely; we are
the defenders of our highest musical inheritance, of its fullness
and fulfilling purity. To further this defense, we must win over
the Volk through orderly plans of education [Erziehung]. Our
foundational work strives for unity, and we must strive to
complete the desired and worthy goal: to create the great musical
unity of Germans and to further struggle for the world recognition
of German music. 31
With “world recognition of German music” came the possibility of German music
serving as the glue for a new German empire.

Indeed, military campaigns into

such regions as Poland and Ukraine prompted German musicologists to press hard
for folk music education as a means of cementing the consolidation of the newly
acquired Eastern territories. 32

As the Germans knew from their own experience,

political consolidation could be considered complete only when broad masses of

29
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citizens could raise their voices to the same tunes and words without fear of
reproach.
National Socialist efforts to guarantee the loyalty of German youth,
however, inevitably clashed with ecclesiastical tradition.

Up until the

forceful emergence of youth movements in the early twentieth century, German
churches had held a monopoly on ritualistic rites of passage.

A regional

report from a National Socialist Party Chancellery in April 1943 outlined
several difficulties confronting the party in its competition with the churches.
The report stated that although induction ceremonies for new Hitlerjungend had
followed all guidelines issued by the Propaganda Ministry, progress in
recruiting new members remained slow.

The report complained:

These [Hitlerjungend] ceremonies are still not accorded the importance
which they deserve, particularly in those districts where the churches
are strong. The fact that a large number of those being inducted had
already participated in a corresponding church ceremony was
particularly invidious. 33
The report went on to highlight the importance of the “musical background of
the ceremonies,” criticizing wartime conditions for the lack of “appropriate
musical backing.” 34

Although Germans were feverishly importing pianos

appropriated from Jewish homes in France and the East, Allied bombs were
steadily consuming musical instruments of all vintages, particularly pipe
organs. 35

As posited by the educator Stumme, the organ was absolutely

necessary for instilling the baptismal “spirit of Nazi celebration”
[“nationalsocialistische Feiergestaltung”]. 36

Lacking an appropriate musical

backdrop, local Hitler Youth leaders could rely only on group song to create
the mystical ambience for the rituals. Ultimately, the combined strength of

33
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Nazi art and music was unable to uproot sacred institutions whose techniques of
musical and aesthetic indoctrination had matured over millennia. 37
Wagner and National Socialist Culture
In their drive towards legitimacy, the Nazi Party took pre-existing
elements of German nationalism and amplified them tremendously.

In the Nazi

period, therefore, the philosophical underpinnings of musical culture
increasingly rested upon Wagnerian ideals.

The composer’s well-known writings

and compositions accorded with Hitler’s ideology, and the cult of Wagner grew
prodigiously under the Nazis. 38

Wagner Societies, already a fixture of

bourgeois [Bürgerlich] German life, further proliferated across the country.
Individuals joined for divergent reasons: some were prompted by Hitler’s
nationalistic awakening, others by careerist desires, while others desired only
the appearance of ideological conformity.

Reflecting the prevalence of Wagner

as a symbol for German culture, Wehrmacht troops brought scores of the opera
Parsifal to Paris, placing their Teutonic totems prominently in the looted
homes of elite French musicians. 39

Even simple German soldiers took great

pains to affront French musical culture and thereby validate German national
pride. 40
Among artistic circles, Wagner formed the centerpiece of Germanic musical
rhetoric.

In an essay in the prominent journal Die Musik, critic Walter

Abendroth decried recent products of modernism while holding up Wagner as the
unattainable paragon of German musical expression:

[Avant-garde music] was a foul, anti-Volk bacillus that
denigrated the cultural body through cynicism and calculation.
37
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Thus, we seek a renewed clarity to eliminate this bacillus
which has caused much grief. So we come – in the sight of our
society, misled classes, and uprooted intellectuals – and
return to the agreed music-historical situation: composers
(not only Germans but naturally especially Germans) are
groaning under the expressive weight of the name and the
spirit of Richard Wagner. 41
Wagner, in other words, served as a perpetually-correct model from whom proper
inferences could be drawn.
Hitler’s personal connection to the cult of Bayreuth made Wagner’s image
all the more powerful during the Gleichschaltung, when moderate statements and
apolitical behavior were cause for suspicion. 42

Hitler’s intense interest in

Wagner’s ideals stemmed from the Austrian’s adolescent self-perceptions as a
transient artist in Linz and Vienna, cities where he attended many operas as a
virtual bottom-feeder in high cultural circles.

Some have speculated that

Hitler’s failings as a young man enflamed his deep desire to use the arts,
particularly opera and the visual arts, as a means of propelling him to a
position from which he could “save Germany.” 43

A performance of Wagner’s

Rienzi in 1906 had called forth visions of grandiosity in the young vagrant. 44
Wagner’s musical architecture, his ideals of Gesamtkunstwerk, and his heroic
heralds had influenced Hitler profoundly. 45

Moreover, Hitler’s traits of

nationalistic anti-Semiticism found validation in the Wagnerian oeuvre.
Hitler’s intimate connections to Wagnerian art forms profoundly
influenced the artistic direction of state policy in the Third Reich.

This

influence extended beyond Hitler’s idle table talk about the supremacy of
German tenors. 46

Wagner’s opera was accorded with the highest respect by the

Nazi Germany because Wagner’s work celebrated the genesis of the German nation
41
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and exuded an ebullient volkstum.

Wagner’s Die Meistersinger was the primary

expression of state-sponsored national identity. 47
Celebrations of Wagner’s genius (and, by extension, the creative potency
of the German people) were undertaken at tremendous state expense.

In December

1938, for example, Hitler’s adjutant personally authorized a payment of 150,000
DM for Clemens Kraus to direct Tannhäuser and Arabella in the Munich State
Theater. 48

Naturally, the NSDAP leadership could justify such expenses with

arguments about culture superiority and the need to instill the German Volk
with the myths of their origins.

Hitler’s birthday celebrations were typically

Wagnerian affairs, although Verdi’s operas were sometimes performed in a
concession to the alliance with fascist Italy. 49

Hitler’s devotion to the

annual festival in Bayreuth was such that in the dark days of late 1944, Hitler
insisted that the Wagner festival scheduled for July 1945 proceed as usual. 50
Hitler ultimately saw the fundamental political gain to be reaped by
declaring himself as the paladin of a reinvigorated and authentically German
culture. From his position at the pinnacle of the National Socialist hierarchy,
Hitler skillfully played the cultural card to buttress his legitimacy.

Richard

Wagner’s music would serve a vital function in this endeavor.

Degenerate Music
Clearly, Nazi officials wished to use music didactically, using opera and
symphonic music to heighten the sense of Teutonic identity among the listeners.
Yet Nazi musical policy was not immune to popular pressures and public demand.
Goebbels and his subordinates could never escape the necessity of providing
light entertainment for the masses.

This contradiction between high and

middlebrow culture became markedly apparent in the wake of military defeats of
1942, which heralded shortages of food and consumer goods, as well as the
47
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discretionary funds. When a Japanese violinist toured Germany in 1942,
Goebbels personally presented her with a priceless Stradavarius. See Prieberg,
ibid.
49
Prieberg, Musik im NS-Staat, p. 309.
50
Kohler, Wagner’s Hitler, p. 268.
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initiation of Allied bombing.

While Goebbels wanted to strengthen the backbone

of the populace with extravagant paeans to sacrifice, such as the film
“Koblenz,” German citizens increasingly demanded distraction from the
heightening destruction around them.

Like filmmaking, opera was expensive, but

Nazis were willing to pay the price.

Ultimately, however, distracting citizens

with popular broadcast music became more important than engaging them in a
polemical musical discussion of Germany’s racial origins.
American music, particularly jazz, had flooded into Germany in the 1920s.
Nationalist responses to this music focused on the negative African origins of
jazz while combining fears of American occupation of the Rhineland.

“Entarte

musik,” or “degenerate music,” became a frequent target for the Nazis.

The

Nazis endeavored to steer Germans, particularly the young, away from such
degenerative effects.

In a directive to his propaganda ministry, Goebbels

stated: “Publications should be produced in a popular style aimed at the masses
and, in particular, at young people, and should demonstrate that the uncritical
adoption of certain American activities, such as jazz music...shows a lack of
culture.”

51

Extending on this theme, Goebbels instructed his subordinate to

refer explicitly to “the grotesque distortions which occur, for example, in the
transposition of Bach’s music into jazz.” 52

Germanic music, like the Volk

itself, had to remain pure.
Also dangerous to national morals was the music of the new avant-garde,
which had reached a heyday during the free-wheeling Weimar period. 53
Individuals like Paul Hindemith, scarred by the experiences of World War One,
had freely released their angst, and in so doing, had vented their distaste for
the political and artistic order.

Under the new life of the National

Socialists, potentially dissenting voices were more or less silenced.

In a

1934 essay from the newly co-opted NS musical organ, Die Musik, a musicologist
discussed the orthodox view of the avant-garde:

Everywhere in Europe, we Germans have released the immediate
products of cultural decay, which fall under the name “New Music.”
This “music” devours our Volk’s living and characteristic art music,
directly attacking our healthy origins that presently and by all
means long to recover the smallest Lebensraum. This “New Music,” in
51

Goebbels’ instructions at daily conference, 16 December 1941. Quoted in
Jeremy Noakes, Nazism 1919-1945: A Documentary Reader, p 485.
52
Ibid.
53
Peter Gay, Weimar Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968).
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sprit and essence, is antithetical to the people [unvolkstümlich]
because it releases every natural dissatisfaction. Worse yet, it
both knowingly and unconsciously denigrates the possession of the
healthy feelings and desires felt by the strong, self-knowing Volk,
whose music is a singular medium of expression, alert and
humorous. 54
Faced with such pabulum in the mid-1930s, cutting-edge composers like Hindemith
and Krenek had left Germany.
As for the state at war, clearly the Nazis could not stem the tide toward
escapism in German musical life.

Strauss’ Arabella, a vapid three-act comedy

set in nineteenth-century Vienna, was the most well known opera of the Nazi
period.

The opera’s libretto is utterly devoid of political content, and there

is nothing particularly Germanic about the story, other than the Viennese
setting.

But given the circumstances, the work functioned as a display of

normalcy in a faltering domestic economy.
Far from the tinsel of opera houses in cities such as Berlin, German
troops were listening to catchy popular tunes on BBC radio.

The Wehrmacht

brass complained of this fact to Goebbels, who thereafter conceded that German
radio should retool summer programming in favor of relaxing comedy and light
entertainment.

In a rare bit of self-deprecation, Goebbels characterized the

possible opposition to this idea: “We know that there are a number of grumblers
who can’t bear that idea and believe that one would survive the war better in
sackcloth and ashes than with entertainment, cheerfulness and inner calm.”
Goebbels further remarked that “these things have been carefully thought out
and considered from all sides,” pre-empting complaints from cultural elites who
might perceive an unwelcome shift in the policy. 55

Even in the prior period,

Goebbels had shown some flexibility toward popular music, remarking:

Not all music suits everyone. Therefore that style of entertaining
music that is found among the broad masses also has a right to exist,
especially in an epoch in which the task of the state leadership must
be, next to the difficult concerns that the times bring with them, to

54

Walter Abendroth, „Kunstmusik und Volstümlichkeit“ in Die Musik, März 1934, s.
413-414. Quoted in Wulf, Musik im Dritten Reich, p. 359.
55
Goebbels’ statement read at Ministerial Conference, 21 May 1941. Quoted in
Jeremy Noakes, p 502.
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intervene on behalf of the Volk’s recuperation, support, and
refreshment. 56
Acknowledging “difficult times,” Goebbels could justify sponsorship of music
that might otherwise have verged on the “degenerate.”

Conclusion
German-speaking lands have always enjoyed a special connection with music.
Germanic composers were a dominant creative force in classical music from the
eighteenth century.

Given this weighty musical inheritance and the preeminent

position of classical music in German life, the atrocities of the Second World
War stand in stark contradiction to the subtle humanism with which German
classical music is imbricated.

Indeed, classical music always lies at the crux

of a question often posed of the period: “How could the Germans who held Bach,
Beethoven, and Schubert so dear inflict such human cruelty as the final
solution?”

Unfortunately, Hitler’s state turned this question on its head.

The Nazis wielded the legacy of Bach, Beethoven, and Schubert precisely to
justify the defense and expansion of German culture against “cultural
Bolshevism.”

Faced with the question of musical culture in the midst of war,

the Nazis may well have replied: “It is precisely because we love Bach,
Beethoven, and Schubert that we inflict such cruelty.”

56

„Musikfest woche für das ganze Volk. Dr. Goebbels sprach auf den Düsseldorfer
Reichsmuiklagen.“ Volkische Beobachter, Nr. 149, 29 Mai 1938, s. 5, quoted in
Prieberg, Musik im NS-Staat, p. 279.
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